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Layoffs, Pecalland theDuration of Unenployrrent
ABSTRACT
This paper shows that the prospect of recall to previous employer is
important for a significant number of the unemployed in the United States and
that taking into account the possibility of recalls has important implications
for the study of unemployment spell durations. A job search model that allows
for recalls is shown to lead naturally to a competing risks specification of
the distribution of layoff unemployment spell durations in which recall and the
taking of a new job are alternate routes for leaving unemployment. A large
sample of individual layoff unemployment spell observations derived from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics is analyzed. The common finding for samples
containing individuals with nonnegligible recall prospects of an escape rate
from unemployment that declines with spell duration is shown to almost entirely
result from a declining recall rate. The apparent declining recall rate may be
indicative of important uncontrolled heterogeneity rather than true negative
duration dependence. Strong positive duration dependence in the new job
finding rate is uncovered for UI recipients. Factors raising the likelihood
and value of recall appear to depress the new job finding rate. Substantial
differences in the distribution of unemployment spell durations are found for
UI recipients and nonrecipients. Large positive jumps in both the recall
rate and new job finding rate are apparent around the point of UI benefits
exhaustion for UI recipients. The results indicate that the potential duration
of UI benefits plays an important role in the timing of recalls and of new job
acceptances.
Lawrence Katz




The determination of the factors affecting the length of time spent out of work by unemployed
individuals is a matter of considerable significance with important implications for the design and
impact of policies such as unemployment compensation and trade adjustment assistance programs.
Over the past decade, many studies have attempted to empirically analyze the determinants of indi-
vidual unemployment spell durations.1 Most of these studies have been motivated by job search
models which (at least implicitly) focus on the behavior of new entrants to the labor force or work-
ers' permanently displaced from their previous employers with certainty. The possibility of recall to
a former job, a process not requiring search, is typically not present in these models.2
Yet, in the United States, there is considerable evidence that the prospect of recall is relevant
for a substantial number of the unemployed. A significant fraction of workers in manufacturing
who lose their jobs are subsequently rehired by their former employers (Feldstein, 1975; Lilien,
1980). Additionally, Barron and Mellow (1979) and Bradshaw and Scholl (1976) show that a sub-
stantial number of workers on "temporary" layoff search for alternative jobs during their unemploy-
ment spells. BLS monthly figures since 1970 indicate that typically at any point of time only about
15 to 25 percent of job losers on layoff can be classified as workers on fixed-duration layoff with
instructions to return to work within 30 days.3 The majority of workers on temporary layoff in a
cross-section are workers on indefinite layoff.
Further information on the importance of recall prospects is available from a sample of 806
male unemployment insurance (UI) recipients in Missouri and Pennsylvania in l979-l980. Each
was asked very close to the time of layoff whether he expected to be recalled to his previous
employer. Seventy-nine percent of the sample expected to be recalled. Seventy-six percent of those
1. See, for example, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976), K.iefer and Neumann (1979), Lancaster (1979), Narendranatham,
NickeD, and Stern (1985), and Solon (1985).
2. Exceptions in the theoretical literature include Burdett and Mortensen (1978), Pissarides (1982), and White
(1983). None of these papers takes into account the impact of worker uncertainty about the likelihood of recall on
job search behavior.
3. The data from which these figures were derived originated through Bob Bednarzik at the U.S. Department of La-
bor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
4. This sample is derived from a data set described in Corson and Nicholson (1983). The specific sample used for
these calculations is described and analyzed in detail in Katz (1985).2
who initially expected to be recalled actually had layoff spells ending in recall. Twenty percent of
those not expecting to be recalled had spells terminating in recall. These figures suggest that the
prospect of recall is relevant for most UI recipients and that some uncertainty concerning their
recall chances may be present for a large number of the unemployed.
In this paper, I show that taking into account the possibility of recalls has quite important
implications for the empirical study of unemployment spell durations. These considerations have
not been adequately treated in previous empirical research. I demonstrate that job search models
extended to allow for recalls naturally lead to a competing risks model specification of the distribu-
tion of layoff unemployment spell durations in which recall and the taking of a new job are viewed
as alternate routes for leaving unemployment. This specification differs sharply from the methods
utilized in previous empirical studies of unemployment spell duration.5
A major implication of the competing risks model specification for layoff unemployment spells
is that job search theoretic and UI related factors affecting the reservation wage generate predictions
concerning the new job finding rate. These predictions need not necessarilly hold for the typically
analyzed overall reemployment hazard since it is a convolution of both the recall rate and the new
job finding rate.
Previous empirical analyses of unemployment spell durations utilizing samples including work-
ers with nonnegligible recall prospects, such as Solon (1985) and Clark and Summers (1979), have
tended to find that the overall reemployment rate declines with time spent unemployed. One
interpretation of this finding is that it is indicative of true negative duartion dependence. This inter-
pretaion potentially casts doubt upon the empirical importance of a large number of standard job
search models.6 An alternative view is that these results arise from the potentially important bias
5. Previous studies involving the analysis of layoff unemployment spells have used either regression methods or the
traditional single risk duration model associated with job search models in which the possibility of recalls is exclud-
ed. Examples of studies using regression methods include Corson and Nicholson (1983) and Classen (1979). Flinn
and Heckman (I 982a) provide a convincing critique of the use of regression methods in duration studies. Examples
of studies utilizing single risk models include Clark and Summers (1979), Ham and Rca (1985), and Solon (1985).
Recalls have typically been treated either by adding a recall dummy as a regressor or by deleting observations with
spells ending in recall.
6. Mortensen (1984) and Flinn and Heckman (1982b) discuss a variety of job search models that yield predictions of
declining reservation wages and positive duration dependence in the unemployment escape rate.3
caused by unobserved heterogeneity. If some workers because of unobserved factors have lower
reemployment probabilities than other seemingly identical workers, they will tend to be unemployed
longer. This can generate inferences of spurious negative duration dependence since among obser-
vationally identical workers those unemployed longer have lower escape rates.7 In fact, these results
provide little information concerning the role of job search and UI factors on new job finding since
they confound the new job escape rate with the recall rate.
Implementation of the theoretically appropriate competing risks model for layoff unemploy-
ment spell durations requires a data set that distinguishes recalls from new job transitions. I have
developed and empirically analyzed such a data set containing 1055 layoff unemployment spell
observations from Waves 14 and 15 of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
A number of striking findings emerge from this empirical analysis. Strong positive duration
dependence in the new job finding rate is found for UI recipients. This result is hidden in single risk
models. The shapes of the sample hazard functions differ substantially for UI recipients and nonre-
cipients. Positive jumps in both the recall hazard and the new job finding rate are found near the
point of UI benefits exhaustion for UI recipients. Similar spikes in the hazard functions do not
appear for UI nonrecipients. This is strong evidence of an important role of the potential duration
of UI benefits in the timing of recalls and of worker new job acceptances.
The paper is organized as follows. A discussion of the implications of job search models
extended to take into account the possibility of recalls for the empirical anlaysis of layoff unemploy-
ment spells is presented in section II. The data set utilized is described in section III. Section IV
contains an analysis of nonparametric sample hazard function estimates. The empirical implemen-
tation of both single risk and competing risks specifications with heterogeneity controls is presented
in section V. Concluding remarks are found in section VI.
7.Beckman and Singer (1984a, 1984b) and Lancaster (1979) provide discussions of the biases generated by unob-
served heterogeneity in duration models.II. Theoretical Background: Job Search with the Possibility of Recall8
In standard job search models, such as the model of McCall (1970), job offers are generated by
unemployed workers through costly job search. The probability of leaving unemployment in a small
time interval conditional on having been unemployed up to the start of the interval (known as the
hazard rate or escape rate) is the product of the probability of receiving a job offer in the interval
and the probability that such an offer is acceptable.9 These models generate a single risk model of
the distribution of unemployment spell durations in which unemployment spells end through the
single escape route of the finding of an acceptable new job.
This approach is not appropriate for analyzing workers on layoff with some possibility of
recall. An unemployment spell can end for a worker on layoff through either the location of an
acceptable new job by search or through recall to the previous employer. The prospect of recall
directly affects the overall escape rate from unemployment through the recall rate and indirectly
affects it by altering workers' optimal job search strategy. In this section, 1 analyze how the possibil-
ity of recall alters a worker's job search behavior and discuss the implications of taking account the
possibility of recall for the statistical distribution of unemployment spell durations.
The job search behavior of workers on layoff can be analyzed in a model that represents an
extension of the infinite horizon sationary search model of McCall (l970).10 Jobs for laid-off work-
ers are generated from two sources: (1) recall by the former employer and (2) random search as in
the standard McCall model. The worker on layoff makes the dual choice of (a) whether to search
for an alternative job, and (b) what reservation wage (or reservation job value) to set in the event of
search. In making these decisions, the worker treats the recall probability as a parameter.
The escape rate out of layoff unemployment depends on both the instantaneous probability of
recall and on the worker's job-search policy. Recall is generated from a Poisson process with
8. A more detailed and formal analysis of the models discussed in this section can be found m Katz (1985).
9. My discussion in this section concerns full-time labor force participants who do not leave unemployment through
dropping out of the labor force.
10. The model presented here is a modified continuous-time version of the model developed by Pissarides (1982).
Pissarides presents an analysis of firms optimal recall policies as well as an analysis of job search for workers on
layoff.5
parameterp. Initially, I take p to be known by the worker and constant over time. If instantaneous
job search cost c (c￿O)isincurred, job offers arrive from a Poisson process with fi.xed-over-time and
known parameter A. The probability of receiving a new job offer in the small time interval h is
Ah + o(h)Succesive job offers are independent realizations from a known absolutely continuous
lifetime job value distribution F(J).'2 The Poisson processes generating recall and alternative job
offers are assumed to be independent.13
Workers are assumed to be risk neutral, lifetime discounted expected income maximizers. The
job value distribution and economic environment are assumed stationary. It is also assumed that
once a worker accepts an alternative job. he or she can no longer be recalled to his or her former
job. The implications of the relaxation of this assumption are dealt with later on in this section.
The reservation job value, f, is initially assumed to be given. An expression can then be
derived for the expected returns from search. If the worker finds it optimal to search, the reserva-
tion job value then determines (a) the hazard rate associated with leaving unemployment to a new
job and (b) the expected job value in a new job conditional on acceptance jeTheindividual
decides whether to search (s= I) or not to search (s=O) during layoff by comparing the maximized
expected returns from the layoff state with search to the expected returns without search.
The following lifetime returns are defined:
V =expectedreturns during layoff
=expectedreturns from recall to former job
je= expectedreturns from new job, after the move has been made.
Workers are assumed to have infinite horizons and to discount future incomes at constant rate
r.Incalculating lifetime returns, workers take into account the following additional exogenous vari-
ables:
11. 0(h) is defined to be a term such that urn (0(h)/h).—s. 0.
12. Workers are assumed to have positive discount rates so that lifetime expected job value is a well-defined concept.
If workers can be laid off from their jobs, it reduces the algebra great1 to work with lifetime job values rather than
explicit1, writing down expressions for the value of new jobs and dealing with reservation wages.
13. This assumption means the analysis in this section should be viewed as pertaining to movements in p and X after
controlling the common local and aggregate local market conditions. The independence assumpton is then plausible
in the case where acceptance of a ne job precludes future recall to a worker's previous job6
b=instantaneousunemployment compensation, paid throughout unemployment spell
m =once-for-allcost of changing jobs
w0 =instantaneouswage on former job.
The expected returns from layoff can be written as





The first term on therightside of (1) is the discounted value of unemployment compensation
net of expected search costs over interval h. The second term is the probability of recall times the
discounted value of recall. The third term is the discounted expected value of job change multiplied
by the probability of job change in interval h. The final term is the discounted value of remaining
on layoff times the probability of still being on layoff after h. J is the upper boundary of the sup-
port of the lifetime job value distribution. q is the probability that a new job offer is acceptable.
The value of recall, ,isgiven by
h dh /(l—dh) + + (2) l+rh l+rh l+rh
wherelayoffs are assumed to come from a Poisson process with parameter d. This expression is
based on the assumption that if a worker is recalled he or she is recalled to his or her former job at
the former wage. It is also assumed that workers prefer recall to the unemployment state.
Taking the limit as h—.O and eliminating W0 in (1) using (2), one can solve for V yielding




Theworker chooses the reservation job value jrtomaximize V given s=l (V(s=l)). The
worker then compares the value of V(s= 1) at the optimum reservation job value to V(s=O), the7
expected returns from the layoff state with no search, for the purpose of determining whether to
search or not to search.
The first-order condition for the optimal reservation job value can be written as
V(s=l)=Xf(y)[P+m+V(sl)1=0.




ä2Vs =1)<0, so the reservation job value that satisfies (4) is the unique value that
maximizes (3) given s= 1.
The reservation job value accords with intuition. The worker chooses JTsuchthat after being
compensated for moving costs, the worker is indifferent between continued layoff unemployment
and having a job with value Y.
The reservation job value increases with the recall arrival rate parameter p. This can be seen
by differentiating j'withrespect to p:
=ÔV(s=l)>0
op
The reservation job value (or reservation wage) also rises with declines in job search and job chang-
ing costs and with increases in the wage at the current job and the level of the unemployment
insurance benefit.
The next issue is whether the worker finds it optimal to search during layoff (s= 1) or simply to
wait for recall (s=0). The decision whether to search or not depends on the recall arrival rate p.
Katz (1985) shows that two cases arise in the search choice problem. In the first case, there exists a
unique recall arrival rate p°,suchthat if p >p°,the individual will not search during layoff, but if
p <p°.he or she will search. The second case can arise if search costs are quite small or nonex-
istent. In this case, the worker searches for all values of p. In both cases, the new job finding rate
declines in p since the reservation job value rises with p. Better recall prospects reduce the new job8
escape rate. The key theoretical prediction is that the new job escape rate is negatively related to
the recall probability.
The analysis so far has assumed that if a worker accepts a new job, he or she is precluded from
receiving a future recall offer to his or her previous job. The structure of the layoff-recall process in
the United States is not always consistent with this assumplion. In fact. unless a worker relocates or
moves out of contact with his previous employer, acceptance of a new potentially temporary job
need not affect the worker's recall chances. It is shown in Katz (1985) that the basic theoretical
result that the new job finding rate is depressed by better recall prospects continues to hold, under
reasonable assumptions, when the model is altered to the other extreme by assuming that taking a
new job has no effect on an individual's recall prospects.
The recent empirical work of Topel (1983; 1984) suggests that the unemployment insurance
system has its strongest impact in increasing the incidence of temporary layoff unemployment. The
model presented here suggests the unemployment insurance system may do this by allowing firms to
layoff workers with a smaller chance of losing them to alternative employers.
I turn now to the statistical implications of the model. The statistical model of layoff spell
durations generated by the theory is a competing risks model of the type frequently used in the
failure time analysis literature.'4 Layoff spells can end either through recall or through the finding
of an acceptable alternative job. There are two competing exit routes or risks, and whichever risk
occurs first terminates the unemployment spell. The competing risks literature approaches problems
of this sort by defining latent failure times corresponding to each failure type. Let T, be the latent
failure time until recall and let T be the latent failure until new job acceptance. The actual unem-
ployment spell duration T is then given by
T =min(Tr ,T).
Theprobability that a layoff unemployment spell T exceeds t depends on the probability of
no recall before t and of no acceptable new job offer arriving before t. A consequence of the
14. Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) provide a detailed discussion of the competing risks model. Flinn and Heckman
(1 982b) and Farber (1980) present examples of labor market models that yield competing risks specifications.9
Poisson process arrival assumptions is that each of the random variables T and T has an exponen-
tial distribution. The survivor function P(TU ￿t)canbe written as
+kq)).
The overall escape rate (hazard rate) from unemployment is
dlnp(T￿t)
di =p+Xsq.
Thisstationary model yields no duration dependence (i.e. a constant hazard rate over time). The




Theexpected duration of unemployment is is I /(p +Xsq).
I have assumed so far that the recall probability is known by the worker. This is not always
realistic. Workers often cannot immediately tell if layoffs arising from reduced demand at the level
of the firm represent a temporary phenomenon or a permanent shift in the firm's level of demand.
It may take a while for workers and firms to realize that a layoff is likely to be permanent. Thus, it
seems likely, holding other factors constant, that the longer a worker is unemployed without recall,
the less likely he or she will perceive his or her recall prospects to be.
Katz (1985) has formalized this notion in a model of layoff unemployment in which workers
are uncertain of their recall prospects and learn about them over the course of their unemployment
spells in a Bayesian manner. In this model, a worker on layoff forms initial beliefs about his or her
instantaneous recall probability p using past experience and observation of market conditions. These
beliefs about p are summarized by a prior density function. In a discrete time formulation, each
period the worker is on layoff he or she is either recalled or not recalled. Workers remaining
15. The cause specific hazardsaredefined as
P(t<T<t+,J=jIT>t)
h(t)=hm C
wherej=r,n and J is the mode of failure.10
unemployed must have received no recall draws in each previous period of unemployment. Each no
recall draw leads a worker to revise downward his or her beliefs about the likelihood of recall. The
perceived recall probability declines with duration of unemployment since the longer the spell the
more no recall draws encountered. The model generates a declining reservation job value as the
duration of unemployment increases. The probability that a worker searches increases with unem-
ployment duration. The learning model generates a new job hazard with positive duration depen-
dence and yields a declining reservation wage.
The standard infinite horizon, stationary environment search model with no recalls yields an
optimal search strategy that is stationary (i.e. a constant reservation wage). A number of
modifications to this standard model generate positive duration dependence even without allowing
for recalls. For example, liquidity constraints (Mortensen, 1984) generate a reservation wage that
declines with time spent unemployed. The limited potential duration of unemployment insurance
(UI) benefits can generate positive duration dependence in the new job hazard up to the point of
benefits exhaustion (Mortensen, 1977). Alternatively, stigma in the labor market attached to
extended joblessness and worker discouragement can yield tendencies towards negative duration
dependence. The addition of the possibility of recall with uncertainty about the recall probability
can also generate a declining reservation wage.
The important point is that the job search factors which impact on reservation wage policies
listed above all generate implications concerning the new job escape rate. These need not neces-
sarilly translate into equivalent predictions for the overall escape rate from unemployment for work-
ers with nonnegligible recall prospects. Thus, findings of negative duration dependence in single
risk models for samples including workers for whom recall is a possibility (e.g. Solon, 1985; Clark
and Summers, 1979) need not imply rejections of the importance of learning about recall or of job
search factors.
III. Data Description
Existing samples of individual level unemployment spell data are quite incomplete and almostall fail to distinguish recalls from new job exits. Still, a large sample of layoff unemployment spells
that distinguishes recalls from new job exits can be extracted from Waves 14 and 15 of the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID))6 These two waves of the PSID have detailed questions on the
previous year's unemployment experience of household heads. I can determine for the head's last
unemployment spell in the previous year: the spell duration in weeks, how the spell was initiated,
and whether it ended through recall, ended through the taking of a new job or was censored at the
interview date. The relevant questions were only asked of labor force participants at the time of the
interview.
The unit of observation that I utilize is the unemployment spell. The necessary information is
available only for household heads, and for each household head the relevant data exist only for the
head's last unemployment spell at least partially contained in 1980 and his or her last spell at least
partially contained in 1981. A last spell of unemployment from the previous year made it into my
sample if it satisfied the following conditions:
1. the head at the time of interview was head previous year;
and
2. (a) the spell ended in recall to the previous employer;
or
(b) the spell ended with a new job transition and the previous job separation was ini-
tiated by a layoff or firing;
or
(c) the spell is censored and the head lists self at next interview as on temporary layoff at
the time of the interview or lists self as unemployed having separated from last job by
layoff or firing.
The PSID does not distinguish between job separations through layoffs and through firings, although
it does allow one to distinguish other routes of job separation such as quits and plant closings from
16. A description of the PSID can be found in Survey Research Center (1984). A more detailed discussion of the
construction and basic characteristics of the sample used in this study is available in Katz (1985).12
layoffs and firings. Thus, some discharged workers will be included in my data set. Since both BLS
manufacturing turnover data and CPS unemployment data indicate that layoffs are far more
numerous than firings (discharges for cause), this should not be a big problem.
A potential problem with this data set is that the PSID provides information only on an
individual's last unemployment spell at least somewhat overlapping the year previous to an inter-
view. This sampling scheme is likely to oversample longer unemployment spells. In a two state
model of employment and unemployment in which the transition probabilities are independent
processes, the sampling procedure of picking only an individual's last spell overlapping the sampling
time frame oversamples longer spells, downward biases the estimates of the unemployment to
employment transition probability and upward biases estimates of expected unemployment spell
duration. These results are demonstrated in the appendix to this paper. The effects are less clear
when the transition probabilities from employment to unemployment and from unemployment to
employment are not independent. It seems possible that estimates from this data set tend to overes-
timate expected unemployment spell durations and underestimate the hazard rates. It is also shown
in the appendix that this sampling frame can generate spurious inferences of positive duration
dependence for unemployment spells. Yet, when employment spells tend to be longer than unem-
ployment spells, the degree of positive duration dependence spuriously generated by the sampling
scheme cannot be very large. It appears quite unlikely that the degree of positive duration depen-
dence in the new job hazard estimates presented later in this paper could be the spurious result of
the initial conditions problem associated with the sampling mechanism. This claim is supported by
the fact that my duration dependence parameter estimates for a single risk model using this data set
are extremely close to those reported by Solon (1985) for a data set without this sampling frame
difficulty.
The actual sample utilized in my empirical work is restricted to observations for individuals
over 20 and under 65 years old and deletes observations for which relevant data are missing. This
leaves a layoff unemployment spell data set of 1055 observations. Variable definitions and means
and standard deviations of the data are presented in Table 1.17
17. The means of the data in Table I indicate that the sample is not a random sample of the layoff unemployed po-
pulation. A major reason for this is that the PSID oversamples low income households. The extremely high13
The PSID data have two potential weaknesses. The first is that while information is available
on whether an individual received unemployment insurance (UI) at some point during his or her
unemployment spell, there is not adequate information to compute the replacement rate or weekly
benefit level relevant for that particular spell. In the second place, job tenure data for the job from
which the unemployment spell initated is not directly available for many of the spells in the sani-
pie.' 8 Job tenure impacts are analyzed using the sub-sample of the PSID which contains job tenure
information.
The information in Table 1 reveals that 57 percent of the spells in the sample end in recall,
and 23 percent end in the taking of a new job. The remaining 20 percent of the spells in the sample
are censored at the date of the interview. The mean observed spell duration of 17.34 weeks in
Table 1 is not the mean of the completed spell durations since it includes the censored spell dura-
tions.
An easy way to get a handle on the mean completed spell duration and the proportion of spells
predicted to eventually terminate with recall is to estimate a simple competing risks model with no
heterogeneity and no duration dependence allowed. This is the statistical model generated by the
basic theoretical model in a stationary environment presented in section II. I specify the cause-
specific hazard (hi)andnew job hazard (ha)asconstants with h,.= pand h= A.This
specification of the hazard functions means the probability of an unemployment spell lasting at least
till t (the survivor function) is simply exp(—(A+p)t).
A
Themaximum likelihood estimates of p and A for the basic data set are p =.03297and A =
"A
.01340.This yields an expected unemployment duration in the sample of 1 /( A +p) =21.57weeks.
nonwhite proportion of the sample results from this sampling scheme. One potential solution to this problem would
be to delete the observations from the poverty (original Census) sample in the PSID and use only observations
from the random (original SRC cross-section) sample part of the PSID. This procedure would eliminate about half
of the data set. I have estimated the basic empirical specifications discussed in this paper for the entire sample, the
random sample, and for a sample consisting only of married prime age males (ages 25 to 55). The empirical
results concerning the shapes of the hazard functions and the effects of independent variables on layoff spell dura-
tions are qualitatively almost identical for all three of these groupings, I stick to analyzing the results for the larger
data set.
18. Job tenure information is directly available only for spells recorded in the Wave 15 interview. Among the spells
from Wave 15, the information is only available if the individual were employed at the time of the previous year's
interview. The sample with job tenure information suffers from a sample selection problem with the sampling
scheme quite dependent on the previous year's unemployment experience.hi
A4
Thepredicted proportion of spells eventually ending in recall is p/(X+p) =.7110.This recall pro-
portion is quite similar to the rehire rates for temporary layoffs in manufacturing estimated by
Lilien (1980). Still, spells ending in recall account for only 53.3 percent of the total weeks of unem-
ployment among the completed spells in my sample. The overall share of weeks of layoff unemploy-
ment accounted for by spells ending in recall is likely to be much smaller since, dropping the
assumptions of homogeneity and constant duration dependence, not many of the long censored
spells in the sample are likely to have ended in recall.
There are sharp differences in the characteristics of UI recipients and UI nonrecipients in the
PSID data set. UI benefits were received for at least some part of the unemployment spell in 63.6
percent of the observations. Workers in the UI recipient group are more likely to be white, to be
married, to be male, and to have been laid-off from a manufacturing firm. The UI nonrecipients
appear much more so than the UI recipients to be made up of low-income, "disadvantaged" workers
with labor market difficulties. This is not surprising since workers with unstable labor force his-
tories are those most likely to fail to qualify for UI benefits. Additionally, workers discharged for
cause will tend to show up in the nonrecipient group.
IV. Sample Hazard Functions for the PSID Data
A basic tool for the analysis of duration data is the sample hazard function. Nonparametric
hazard function estimates with no heterogeneity controls are presented in this section for the entire
sample and for the UI recipients and UI nonrecipients sub-samples. The weekly duration data is
grouped into four week intervals in this section for ease of presentation.
The hazard function estimates shown in Tables 2, 3, and 4 are based on the K.aplan-Meier
nonparametric hazard function estimator.19 The Kaplan-Meier estimator of the hazard function for
a particular period is simply the number of escapes in the period divided by the population at risk
at the start of the period. The cause-specific hazard function estimators are analogously defined
replacing total escapes by the cause-specific escapes.
19. K.albfleisch and Prentice (1980) discuss the properties of the Kaplan.Meier estimator.15
The sample hazard estimates for the entire sample are presented in Table 2 and plotted in Fig-
ure 1. The overall unemployment hazard is downward sloping with a sharp initial drop after the
first month and positive spikes at 25-28 weeks, 37-40 weeks, and 49-52weeks.The overall unem-
ployment hazard submerges sharp differences in the recall and new job hazard functions. The
downward slope of the unemployment hazard results from the recall hazard component. Most
recalls occur within I to 2 months. The new job hazard function is slightly upward sloping up to
about 40 weeks.
An interesting feature of both the new job and recall hazard functions shown in Figure 1 is
that they both exhibit substantial positive jumps at 25-28 weeks and 37-40 weeks. In the weekly
data, these jumps are almost completely accounted for by the large number of recalls and new job
exits reported at 26 weeks and at 39 weeks. The exact placing of these spikes is not surprising since
Sider (1985) reports that a widespread response bias in surveys collecting information on previous
unemployment experience is the tendency for fairly long spell durations to be reported as lasting
exactly half a year (26 weeks), three quarters (39 weeks), or one year (52 weeks). The importance of
these jumps is suggested by the differences in the shapes of hazard functions for the UI recipient
and nonrecipient groups.
The sample hazard function estimates for the UI recipient and Li! nonrecipient samples are
presented in Tables 3 and 4 and graphed in Figures 2 and 3. One striking feature of these estimates
is that the 26 week and 39 week recall hazard spikes and new job hazard upward shifts are quite
pronounced in the UI recipient sample and nonexistent in the UI nonrecipient sample.2° It is hard
to believe that there are important enough systematic differences between the UI and no UI sample
in the likelihood of an individual misreporting his spell length as around 26 or 39 weeks to explain
these dramatic differences in the sample hazard functions. The upward movements in the recall and
new job hazards near the 26 and 39 week points for UI recipients appear to be real phenomena
related to the limited duration of UI benefits in the United States. The potential UI benefits dura-
20. The Kaplan.Meier estimated asymptotic standard errors for the sample hazard functions indicate that these
jumps are statistically significant at conventional significance levels.16
tion for qualified workers in most states is typically close to or exactly 26 weeks in normal times.
When extended benefits are in effect, the potential UI benefits duration for qualified workers is typi-
cally 39 weeks.
The overall shapes of the sample hazard functions are quite different for the UI and no UI
samples. The UI recipient sample new job hazard function starts out much lower and is much more
upward sloping than the Ui nonrecipients new job hazard function. The major difference between
the new job hazards for the two groups in the first month might be related to the one week waiting
period before UI benefits eligibility in most states and the possibility that eligible workers anticipat-
ing short spells don't apply for benefits and end up in the nonrecipients sample. These factors could
not account for the major differences in the sample hazards for the two groups beyond the first
interval.
One possible explanation for the differences in the UI and no UI groups hazards is that work-
ers who receive UI are better able to wait for a potential recall offer and can afford to be more selec-
tive concerning new job opportunities than those who don't receive UI. Additionally, workers
receiving UI may have a higher value and greater likelihood of recall overall. For the sub-sample of
395 observations for which length of service (tenure) at previous employer data is available, the
average seniority for UI recipients is 5.6 years as opposed to 3.9 years for nonrecipients.
The jumps in both the recall and new job hazards at 26 weeks and 39 weeks for UI recipients
appear to be closely related to the potential duration of UI benefits. The rules concerning UI benefit
duration differ greatly across states. There was a uniform potential duration of 26 weeks in ten
states during the sample period. In the other states, the maximum duration of benefits was typically
26 weeks (and somewhat higher in a few states) although some workers could qualify for fewer
weeks of benefits (Unemployment Benefit Advisors, 1982). Additionally, federally subsidized
extended benefits of 13 weeks (up to a maximum of 39 weeks of benefits collection) were triggered
in a particular state if that state's insured unemployment rate for the previous 13-week period were
above a specified threshold level. Extended benefits could also be triggered nationally when the
national insured unemployment rate was persistently above a threshhold value.Information from the PSID on the start dates of unemployment spells and workers' states of
residence was combined with information on periods in which extended benefits were available for
each state (U.S. Department of Labor, 1983) to determine for each unemployment spell located near
the 26 and 39 week spikes whether it occurred in a period in which the worker could have been eli-
gible for extended benefits. Practically all the UI recipient unemployment spells terminating around
39 weeks occurred in states and periods in which extended benefits were triggered. On the other
hand, three appears to be an even split among the 34 spells at the 26 week spike between locations
and times with and without extended benefits triggered. Given the response bias towards the report-
ing of 26 week spells, these results seem supportive of the implication that both the recall and new
job finding rates for UI recipients are relatively high in the period around when benefits are
exhausted.
There are a number of potential explanations for the increase in the recall rate around the time
of UI benefits exhaustion and the sharp decline in recalls after benefits exhaustion. One explanation
is an implicit contract type explanation such as in the model of Feldstein (1976). Imperfectly
experience-rated firms and their workers may extensively use the UI system in downturns to the
firm's demand. One potential type of utilization would be a rotating system of layoffs in which
workers who exhaust their UI benefits may be recalled and other workers still eligible for benefits
laid off in their place. Seniority layoff systems and efficiency wage considerations might hinder the
ability of firms to rotate layoffs across workers. There does not appear to be much evidence of
rotating layoffs systems in the United States. Still, firms expecting recall within a reasonable hor-
izon might recall workers close to when benefits run out rather than potentially lose them to new
jobs.
The increase in the new job hazard starting at 26 weeks for UI recipients is likely to reflect two
main factors relating to UI exhaustion. The first is the explanation of the standard search model in
which potential recall prospects are ignored. Mortensen (1977) has analyzed such a model in which
the unemployment exit hazard rises as the date of UI exhaustion approaches and then levels out at
the new higher level after U! benefits have run out. The second factor is that given the behavior of18
the firm discussed above, the event of no recall before UI benefits are exhausted is a good signal to
the worker that his future recall chances are quite slim. This will stimulate an increased new job
hazard from the lower reservation wage and greater search intensity induced by a drop in perceived
recall prospects. A learning model of search behavior with uncertain recall prospects combined with
limited UI duration provides a coherent explanation for the shape of the new job hazard function
associated with the UI recipient group and the differences in the distribution of spell durations for
UI recipients and nonrecipients.
V.Econometric Specification and Estimation:ThePSID Data
Inthis section, 1 control for observed variablesinestimating parametric models of layoff
unemployment spell durations. The parmaeter estimates for the control variables indicate how indi-
vidual. industry, and labor market characteristics affect individual vanation in unemployment spell
durations. Competing risks model estimates indicate how these factors impact on the recall and
new job finding rates. The differences in the empirical results for single risk and competing risks
models indicate the problems in making inferences about layoff unemployment spell durations from
traditional single risk model estimates.
The issue of the potential impacts of unobserved heterogeneity on the estimates needs to be
discussed. A number of techniques have been developed in recent years to handle the difficulties
created by unobserved heterogeneity in duration models.2t One method is to assume that the unob-
served heterogeneity components are drawn from a certain parametric distribution. Still, Heckman
and Singer (1984b) demostrate that an incorrect assumption about the parametric form of the distri-
bution of unobserved heterogeneity components can lead to grossly incorrect inferences about dura-
tion dependence. Heclcman and Singer strongly recommend the use of nonparametric methods.
Although some progress has been made in designing nonparametric methods to deal with unob-
served heterogeneity, these methods are still in their infancy especially with respect to empirical
implementation in a competing risks framework. I stick with estimates that are based upon the
2!. HeckmanandSinger (19$4L 1984b) provide excellent discussionsofthe potential biasesgenerated byunob-
served heterogenetty andtechniques for dealing with these problems.inclusion of a large number of observed heterogeneity controls and with no explicit control for
unobserved heterogeneity since the direction of bias in the duration parameter is known to be
towards negative duration dependence in this case. Findings of positive duration dependence in the
new job hazard under these conditions are indicative of true positive duration dependence.
I first turn to the estimation of a traditional single risk model of unemployment spell duration.
A specification of the hazard function determines the distribution of spell durations. I utilize the
proportional hazards model of Cox (1972). The hazard function for an individual i with regressors
X1 is specified as
h(t,X1)=h0(t)exp(X,fl) (6)
whereH is a parameter vector.
Following Lancaster (1979) and Solon (1985), I specify the base-line hazard h0(t) as
h0(t) =Utu ,u>O. (7)
This yields a Weibull duration model. The hazard function displays positive (negative) duration
dependence if u> 1 (u <1)and no duration dependence if u1.
Maximum likelihood estimates of this Weibull specification of the single risk model with
observed heterogeneity controls for both the UI recipient and UI nonrecipient samples are presented
in Table 5. The Weibull duration parameter estimate of .85 for the UI recipient sample is
extremely close to the estimate of .80 reported by Solon (1985) for a single risk Weibull model
applied to a sample of UI recipients from Georgia in 1978-79. The potential bias of unobserved
heterogeneity means the duration parameter estimates are inconclusive with respect to the nature of
true state dependence. The closeness of the duration estimate to that of Solon's indicates that the
bias induced by the PSID sampling scheme is not serious.
The estimates presented in Table 5 for both groups indicate that nonwhites and females have
longer layoff unemployment spells. The estimates of the single risk model are difficult to analyze
since they do not allow one to determine a variable's impacts in spell duration through its effect on
recall prospects and on new job finding. A competing risks model is needed to gain insight into how20
recall prospects and search theoretic factors influence layoff unemployment spell durations.
I now turn to the competing risks model specification. A specification of the recall and new
job cause-specific hazard rates determines the survivor function in a competing risks model.22 I
utilize a Weibull version of the proportional hazards specification of the cause-specific hazards. The
recall and new job cause-specific hazard functions for an individual i with regressor variables .X are
specified as
hr = , a>0 (8)
and
=btbe b>.0 (9)
where 3 and y are parameter vectors.
The probability of an unemployment spell T lasting to at least t for an individual i is the
joint probability of both the latent recall duration Tr and latent new job duration T, both lasting




where h(t,X1) =hr(t,X,)+ h(t,X1). Substituting for h(t,X1) from (8) and (9) yields
G(t,X) =exp(_eX$ta)exp(_e tb). (11)
The likelihood function for the sample follows directly from the specification of the cause-
specific hazards and the resulting survivor function. The contribution to the likelihood function for
an individual recalled after a spell duration of t1 is P(Tr, =t ,T ￿r,). Thus, the contribution for an
individual recalled at t, is the product of the recall hazard and survivor function at t
L, =hr(tj,.X)*G(tL,.Xj). (12)
The contribution to the likelihood function for an individual leaving unemployment through
the taking of a new job at t, is analogously given by
22. K.a!bfleisch and Prentice (1980) discuss the difference between a cause-specific hazard and the hazard associated
with the marginal spell distribution of a particular failure mode in a model with competing risks.21
=h(t, ,X )*G(f ,A, ). (13)
The contribution to the likelihood function for an individual censored at t, is simply the probability
that both the new job and recall hypothetical durations are greater than t1:
=G(t,,X1). (14)
In a sample of N spells, where the first k1endin recall, the next k2endin new jobs, and the
remaining are censored, the overall log likelihood function can be written as
In L =InLr + in L (15)
where
in Lr =k1lna + [(a-l)ln i + X,fl] - (16)
k1+k2 N
in L =k2in b + [(b—I)ln t + Xy] —etjb. (17)
k1+1 1
Thelikelihood function can be broken up into two factors. The first component L, depends only on
the parameters of the recall hazard, and the second L depends only on the new job hazard parame-
ters.
Maximum likelihood estimates of the proportional hazards version of the competing risks
model with extensive observed heterogeneity controls are presented in Tables 6 and 7 for the UI
sample and the UI nonrecipient sample. The UI sample exhibits strong positive duration depen-
dence in the new job hazard. The elasticity of the new job hazard with respect to unemployment
duration is estimated as .44. In the no UI sample, there appears to be negative duration depen-
dence in the new job hazard, although the hypothesis of no duration dependence cannot be rejected.
If the spikes in the sample hazard functions at 26 and 39 weeks for UI recipients are viewed as
discrete events at the UI exhaustion points rather than as indicative of a smoother increase in the
escape rate around when UI benefits run out, a more flexible specification of the hazards than the
Weibull specification in equations (8) and (9) is apropriate. One approach is to augment the22
Weibullspecification to allow discrete jumps in the hazard rate in the one week intervals with




btb_ 'exp(X, y)exp(1r2) 38.5￿t
btb_Iexp(Xy) 39.5<t
where r1andr2arethe 26 and 39 week spike parameters. The recall hazard is analogously defined.
Estimates of the duration and spike parameters for this modified Weibull specification applied to
the UI recipients sample are shown in Table 8. The basic finding of strong positive duration depen-
dence in the new job hazard is not altered with a duration parameter estimate of 1.37. The 26 week
spikes are large and quite significant for both the recall and new job hazards. The estimates of the
heterogeneity control parmeters are almost identical to those of Table 6.
Returning to the estimates presented in Tables 6 and 7, one observes that an increase in age
appears to raise the recall hazard and reduce the new job hazard. This effect may actually be a
proxy for increased job tenure (or seniority) which potentially raises the value of and probability of
recall. When the basic Weibull model is estimated on the sub-sample (UI and no UI) of 395 obser-
vations for which information is available on length of employment at the firm from which the
worker was laid off, the age effect for both the recall and new job hazards becomes quite
insignificant. Tenure at previous employer has a strong positive effect on the recall hazard and an
even stronger negative effect on the new job hazard .Themajor features of the estimates on the
tenure sub-sample are presented in Table 9. These estimates indicate that a 1 year increase in
tenure at the job from which a worker is laid off raises his or her recall hazard by approximately 7.2
percent and reduces his or her new job hazard by about 17.1 percent. This implies that a factor
presumably raising the gains from recall serves to sharply reduce the new job hazard.
The estimates in Table 9 indicate that UI appears to be associated with longer unemployment
spells once seniority (or job tenure) affects are taken into account. The hypotheses that the recall
and new job hazards of the UI recipient and nonrecipients groups are the same or differ in only the23
constant terms can be rejected at any reasonable significance level through likelihood ratio tests for
both the entire sample and the job tenure sub-sample.
I turn now to the impact of the other heterogeneity variables on layoff spell durations. I shall
focus on the estimates for the UI recipient sample presented in Table 6. For both the new job and
the recall hazard rates, one can reject at any reasonable level of significance in a likelihood ratio test
the hypothesis that the heterogeneity controls don't matter. In general, factors that raise the recall
hazard tend to reduce the new job hazard and vice versa. This is quite consistent with the search
model with recall sketched in section II. The main exception is that nonwhites and females have
significantly lower recall and new job hazards than do white males. The adverse outside labor
market conditions faced by many nonwhites and females seem to depress their new job finding rate
more than the increased job search effort related to lower recall prospects seems to increase it.
Years of schooling appears to raise workers new job finding opportunities. Local labor market con-
ditions as proxied by county unemployment rates reduce the new job hazard but have little effect on
the recall hazard. The pattern of industry and occupation dummy coefficient estimates is consistent
with theoretical predictions. Workers in durable goods industries have quite high recall hazards and
quite low new job finding rates.
Another way to assess the effects of recall chances on new job search behavior is to compare
the new job hazard function for workers with no recall possibility to that of those with a positive
recall probability. The unemployment spell data from the PSID does identify whether a worker's
unemployment spell was initiated by a plant closing. Ill plant closing observations have all the
relevant data from which to estimate the basic model. I assume workers who lost their jobs through
plant closings have no recall possibilities. Thus, they make no contribution to the recall part of the
likelihood function.
The lack of a possibility of recall should raise the new job escape rate after controlling for
heterogeneity factors. When the new job component of the likelihood function (equation (17)) is
estimated with the plant closing sample added and a plant closing dummy variable added to the
regressor list, the plant closing dummy comes in statistically significant and quite positive for the2L
entire sample and for both the UI and no UI groups in isolation. For the entire sample, the plant
closing dummy is estimated as .5907 with a standard error of .129. The estimates of the other
parameters do not change at all substantially. The results are quite similar for the UI and no UI
groups when they are broken out separately. These estimates provide strong support for the
hypothesis that greater recall prospects depress new job finding.
A summary of duration dependence parameter estimates in models with observed hetero-
geneity controls for the entire layoff sample, the layoff subsample with job tenure information, and
the plant closing sample is presented in Table 10. Strong positive duration dependence consistent
with a number of search theoretic models and with a model of workers learning about their recall
prospects in a Bayesian manner is apparent in the new job finding rate for the UI recipients in the
layoff sample. This positive duration dependence is hidden in the traditional single risk model
specification for this group.
The recall rate appears to decline with unemployment duration. This may indicate true nega-
tive duration dependence or it may be related to the impact of uncontrolled heterogeneity. One
scenario consistent with the estimated declining recall hazard and increasing new job hazard for UI
recipients is that shocks to demand at the firm level may be heterogeneous and it may take time for
firms and workers to determine the nature of a shock.
A particular example can help illustrate this point. Firms face two states of demand: high
demand and low demand. Firms may choose to adjust to low demand states by placing some work-
ers on layoff. Two types of shocks can knock firms into the low demand state: transitory shocks
and "permanent' shocks. Recovery to the high demand state has a constant arrival rate. The
recovery arrival rate is greater for transitory shocks than for permanent shocks. Firms and workers
can't immediately determine whether downturns are transitory or permanent. The longer a low
demand state lasts the more likely it will appear to be a 'permanent low demand state. The longer
a worker remains on layoff the lower his or her perceived instantaneous recall probability. This
induces a declining reservation wage and positive duration dependence in the new job finding rate.
This heterogeneity in shocks is unlikely to be captured by individual and industry control variables25
and induces apparent negative duration dependence in the recall rate.
The large difference in the duration parameter estimates shown in Table 10 for the UI reci-
pient and nonrecipient groups indicates that the limited duration of unemployment insurance has
an important impact on the duration of layoff unemployment spells. Since previous job tenure is an
important determinant of eligibility for UI benefits, it is important to note that the large differences
in the UI and no UI group estimates remain even after controlling for months of tenure at previous
job. The degree of positive duration dependence for UI recipients in the plant closing sample
potentially indicates the impact of limited UI duration if one believes that these workers attach no
possibility to recall through a plant reopening once they are dismissed. In this case, the greater
degree of positive duration dependence for the UI recipients in the layoff sample can possibly be
taken as a measure of the effect of changing perceptions about recall prospects on new job finding
behavior.
VI. Conclusion
The addition of the possibility of recalls to a job search model yields a competing risks model
specification of the distribution of layoff unemployment spell durations. This specification requires
a substantially different focus in an empirical analysis of layoff unemployment spell durations than
that of traditional studies which tend to ignore the impacts of the recall process and simply analyze
the overall unemployment to employment transition probability through a single risk model. It also
requires a data set that allows the investigator to distinguish recalls from new job transitions.
An empirical analysis of a large sample of individual unemployment spells provides support
for the predictions of job search models modified to take into account the impact of potential recall
to a worker's previous employer. The competing risks model specification uncovers insights into the
distribution of unemployment spell durations masked by the typical single risk approach to analyz-
ing unemployment spell duration data. Strong positive duration dependence in the new job finding
rate is uncovered for UI recipients in the competing risks specification. Comparisons of competing
risks model and single risk model estimates indicate that inferences drawn from single risk models26
for samples including workers with nonnegligible recall prospects can be misleading.
The empirical estimates for the PSID indicate that recall prospects appear to substantially
affect the behavior and labor market outcomes of laid-off workers. The recall hazard is found to
increase with and the new job hazard is found to strongly decrease with job tenure.
Major differences are apparent in the sample hazard functions and in the estimated hazard
functions with observed heterogeneity controls for UI recipient and nonrecipient groups. The recall
and new job finding rates for UI recipients exhibit sharp increases in the intervals surrounding UI
benefit exhaustion dates. Similar behavior is not evident in the hazard functions for UI nonreci-
pients. The differences in the estimated new job hazard for the UI recipient and nonrecipient
groups provide support for the predictions of the job search model of Mortensen (1977) in which
the limited duration of UI benefits is explicitly treated. The results provide strong evidience that
the potential duration of UI benefits has an important impact on the workings of the layoff-recall
process and on the search behavior of laid-off workers.
The basic theoretical and empirical framework developed in this paper can be extended to
analyze the behavior of displaced' workers. In this context, the worker's choice of whether to stay
in his or her own market in hope of future improvements in opportunities as oppossed to undertak-
ing an expensive move to another locale or region in search of better prospects is analogous to the
laid-off workers decision between waiting for recall and undertaking costly search for an alternative
job. This extension may prove useful in understanding the labor market in an economy subject to
important geographic and sectoral shifts of economic activity.27
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Table 1: Variable Definitions and Means (Standard Deviations)
of the Data-PSID Layo Unemployment Spell Sample
Mean Variable Description (Standard Deviation)
Duration observed unemployment spell duration 17.34
in weeks (22.44) Recall =1if spell ended in recall .572
New Job 1 if spell ended in taking .232
of a new job
Censored 1 if spell duration .196
is censored
Age ageinyears 33.15
(10.50) NW =1if nonwhite .506
Fe =1if female .167
Ma =1if married .632
Ed =yearsof schooling 11.34
(2.17) CUN =countyunemployment rate 7.70
(2.55) UI =1if worker received unemployment .636
insurance benefits during some part of spell
Industry
Dummy Variables (*)
Treq =1if in transportation equipment .iio
ODUR =1if in other durable goods .iei
manufacturing
NDUR =1if in nondurable goods .133
manufacturing Trade =1if in wholesale or retail trade .103
Trans =1if in transportation or public .OBO
utilities
Mining =1if in mining or agriculture .034
Serv =1if in services .171
Con 1 if in construction .180
Occupation
Dummy Variables (*)31
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Means (Standard Deviations)
of the DataPSID Layoff Unemployment Spell Sample
Mean
Variable Description (Standard Deviation)
Labor =1if laborer or operative .508
Craft =1if craftsmen or kindred worker .223
Cler =Iif clerical, services or .186
sales worker
Manager 1 if manager .044
Prof =1if professional or technical worker .039
n =1055
(*) Industry and Occupation refer to job from which unemployment spell initiated.32
Table 2: Sample Hazard Function Estimates -EntireSample
PSID Data
Weeks Overall UnemploymentRecallNew Job Population
Hazard Hazard Hazard at Risk
1-4 .354 .307 .047 1055
5-8 .183 .129 .054 682
9-12 .160 .106 .054 557
13-16 .161 .109 .052 466
17-20 .120 .056 .064 375
21-24 .114 .060 .054 299
25-28 .165 .082 .082 243
29-32 .084 .022 .061 179
33-36 .060 .013 .047 150
37-40 .123 .046 .077 130
41-44 .055 .038 .019 104
45-48 .011 .000 .011 94
49-52 .078 .011 .067 90
53-56 .034 .000 .034 59
57-60 .018 .000 .015 55
n=105533
Table3: Sample Hazard Function Estimates -U11Sample
PSID Data
Weeks Overall UnemploymentRecallNew Job Population
Hazard Hazard Hazard at Risk
1-4 .343 .315 .028 671
5-5 .184 .129 .054 441
9-12 .161 .106 .056 360
13-16 .166 .116 .050 302
17-20 .144 .066 .078 243
21-24 .114 .054 .059 185
25-28 .227 .120 .107 150
29-32 .123 .028 .094 106
33-36 .083 .012 .071 84
37-40 .192 .074 .118 68
41-44 .082 .041 .041 49
45-48 .024 .000 .024 42
49-52 .128 .000 .128 39
53-56 .087 .000 .087 23
57-60 .053 .000 .053 19
n =671314
Table 4: Sample Hazard Function Estimates -U10Sample
PSID Data
Weeks Overall UnemploymentRecallNew Job Population
Hazard Hazard Hazard at Risk
1-4 .372 .294 .078 384
5-8 .183 .129 .054 241
9-12 .157 .107 .051 197
13-16 .152 .098 .055 164
18-20 .076 .038 .038 132
21-24 .114 .070 .044 114
25-28 .065 .022 .043 93
29-32 .027 .014 .014 73
33-36 .030 .015 .015 66
38-40 .048 .016 .032 62
41-44 .036 .036 .000 55
45-48 .000 .000 .000 52
49-52 .039 .020 .020 51
53-56 .000 .000 .000 36
57-60 .000 .000 .000 36
n =38435
Table 5: Single Risk Model with Observed Heterogeneity Controls
PSID Data









































Thebase industry is NDIJR; the base occupation is Labor; the numbers in parentheses
are asymptotic standard errors.36
Table 6: Competing Risks Model with Observed Heterogeneity
Controls TJI=1 Sample (n=671) -PSIDData




























Craft .0249 -.03 14
(.255) (.122)
Cler .312 -.282







The base industry is NDUR; the base occupation is Labor; the numbers in parenthses
are asymptotic standard errors.37
Table 7: Competing Risks Model with Observed Heterogeneity
Controls LTl =0Sample (n=384) -PSIDData









































The base industry is NDUR; the base occupation is Labor; the numbers in parentheses
are asymptotic stadard errors.38
Table 8: Modified Competing Risks Model Allowing Discrete
Spikes at 26 and 39 Weeks -U11Sample (n671)
PSID Data








in L -774.74 -1597.71
Controls for race, sex, education, marital status,age, county unemployment rate, industry and occupation and a constant are also included.
Table 9: Competing Risks Model with ObservedHeterogeneity Controls -JobTenure Sub-Sample (n395)
PSID Data




Age -.00477 .0009 1
(.0131) (.0079) Job Tenure -.0156 .0058




In L -440.62 -907.76
Controlsare also included for race, sex, education, marital status,county unemploy- ment rate, industry, and occupation. The numbers inparentheses are asymptotic standard errors.39
Table 10: Summary of Duration Dependence Parameter Estimates
for Models with Observed Heterogeneity Controls
Competing Risks Specification Single Risk Specification
Recall Hazard New Job Hazard Overall Hazard
LayofT Sample
Entire Sample .694 1.138 .784
(n =1055) (.035) (.063) (.029)
1.31= 1 .732 1.440 .854
(n =871) (.044) (.09 1) (.036)
U1=O .679 .881 .722





UI =0 .779 .927







Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.
(s).Noindustry and occupation dummies are included as control variables in the



















































APPENDIXPOTENTIAL BIASES ASSOCIATED WITH THE PSID SAMPLING SCHEME1
The sampling framework for unemployment spells in the PSID does not yield a random sam-
ple of layoff unemployment spells. The likely direction and magnitude of biases in estimating the
distribution of layoff unemployment spell durations from a sample generated by the PSID sampling
scenario are analyzed in this Appendix.
An unemployment spell is picked up by waves 14 and 15 of the PSID only if it is an
individual's last unemployment spell that at least at some point overlaps the calendar year previous
to an interview. I analyze the implications of this sampling scheme under the assumption that
employment and unemployment spells have independent densities. A grasp of the magnitude of the
potential biases is gained by analyzing the illustrative, although far from general, case of employ-
ment and unemployment spells being independent Poisson processes. The analysis focuses on
estimating the overall unemployment escape rate.
The nature of the sampling procedure means that correcting the likelihood function requires
information on the distribution of employment spell durations which because of temporary layoffs is
not the same as a job tenure distribution. The likelihood function correction is complicated further
in a competing risks specification. These additional difficulties and data requirements have led me
to focus on an analysis of the degree of bias in uncorrected likelihood function estimates rather than
attempt to estimate a model with a full likelihood function correction.
An unemployment spell starting at some time t before the end of the year previous to the
interview makes it into the sample only if the spell does not terminate before the start of the year
previous to the interview and if the individual does not have another unemployment spell after the
end of the first spell that begins before the end of the year previous to the interview. The longer an
unemployment spell lasts for any given starting date before the end of the previous year the less
1. Jeff Harris provided invaluable assistance in the preperation of this Appendix.144
likelyis it that the ensuing employment spell will terminate before the end of the sampling frame.
This follows if unemployment and employment spells have independent densities. Thus, the longer
an unemployment spell lasts for a given starting date, the more likely it is to enter the sample. This
framework oversamples long spells leading to an upward bias in the estimate of expected unemploy-
ment spell duration and a downward bias in the estimate of the escape rate from unemployment.
The formal analysis precedes with the following definitions:
t =startdate of an unemployment spell (in reverse time)
y =unemploymentspell duration (in forward time)
I let x denote the event that an unemployment spell enters the sample, and I let g() denote a gen-
eral density function. I shall also let ir()denotea general density function.
The key quantity that needs to be determined for the analysis is the density of unemployment










ir(1)isassumed to be given by the uniform density.2
I let unemployment spell durations have density f(y),andI let employment spell durations have
density h (z) where z is the length of an employment spell. The associated cumulative distribution
function for emplyment spells is given by H(z). This means
r(yIt)=f(y).
2. Thisassumption holds in a steady state environment.45
Additionally, I define
=cutoffdate for entry into sample.
Any spell that terminates before t does not make it into the sample. The PSID sampling frame-
work represents the case of t =52when time is measured in weeks and the further a start date is
in the past the larger the value of t.
The derivation of g(yI x)precedes as follows:
1 ify￿t
g(xI v,t)= 1—JI(t—v) ift —t<y<t
0 ify<t_t*.czt
g(x) = Jg (x y ,t )f(y )dtdy
= + fCv)f[l-H(t-y)]dtth'
For the purpose of producing results that will allow an analysis of the magnitude of potential




J [1 —H(t —y)]dt =O[l—e].
This implies that










This sampling scheme oversamples long spells and leads to too large an estimate of the expected




äBias aBias <0 and
The further assumption that transitions from unemployment to employment follow a Poissonpro-




This differs from the true hazard for the population h(y) =l/qi.Thus,
h(ylx)<h(y)andah(ylx)>0.
Spurious positive duration dependence is generated.
An analysis of realistic values for 0 and reveals that the bias in the estimated duration for
data filtered through this sampling procedure could be as high as 3 to 5 weeks. On the other hand,
the degree of spurious positive duration dependence created by the sampling scheme is notvery
great under reasonable assuptions aboutand 0.It does not seem possible that the sampling
scheme could produce anywhere near the degree of positive duration dependence estimated for UI
recipient groups from the PSID. Thus, these results indicate true positive duration dependence.
The magnitude of potential biases linked to the sampling frame can be illuminated by area-147
sonableexample. In this example, I assume=52,=16,and 0[l—exp(—t'/O)] =40.
A sample generated by this scheme with these underlying population parameter values would leadto
an estimated of approximately 20.57.Thus,a 4.6 week upward bias in estimating E(y)isgen-
erated. The extent of duration dependence created in terms of the elasticity of the hazard with




[+0(I -e'9)+y] +0(1 -e"°)]
Evaluated at the mean spell duration, one attains eh =.06.As long as the reasonable assumption
is maintained that employment spells are longer than unemployment spells (i.e. theunemployment
rate for the group of interest is under 50 percent), one cannot generate values of spurious positive
duration dependence large enough to account for the estimates presented in section V.Thus, the
estimates of duration parameters for UI recipients of the PSID sample do notappear to be merely
an artifact of the sampling scheme.
3. In other words, 0 is approximately 95 weeks.